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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE
Appellant has brought this action for specific performance
to compel Respondents to convey title to certain improved real
estate, ostensibly under a standard form Earnest Money Receipt
and Offer to Purchase.
DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT
This was a non-jury trial which commenced on August 9, 1978
in the Third Judicial District court for Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, the Honorable Dean E. Conder presiding.

The trial court

concluded that the Earnest Money Agreement was not capable of
specific performance, entered judgment in favor of Respondents,
and ordered Respondents to return to Appellant the $500.00 consideration paid by him to Respondents at the time of the execution
of the Earnest Money Agreement.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek affirmation of the conclusions and judgment
of the lower court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents are associated as a General Partnership doing
business under the name of c. Howard Alvey & Sons.

On or about

April 23, 1976 Appellant entered into an Earnest Money Receipt
and Offer to Purchase (hereinafter "Agreement")
Respondents.

[Exhibit 1] with

The Agreement was negotiated for Respondents by

Richard Lambert and was signed by Respondent Michael Alvey.
Lambert and Appellant had had four to six discussions prior to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the signing of the Agreement [R. 66] .

At the time of the signing

Respondents were engaged in negotiations for the sale of four
lots on Hillview Drive, including the corner lot.

Respondents

were subsequently able to purchase three of the four lots.

The

owner of the corner lot had decided not to sell, and Respondents
were unable to obtain it [R. 92-93, 113-14].
The Agreement provided for the sale of "property situated at
the corner of Hillview and Ninth East," for a total purchase
price of $70,000 [Exhibit 1].

Appellant paid $500.00 in Earnest

Money at the time of the signing [Exhibit 3].
At that time it had not been decided which of the three
fourplexes owned by Respondents would be sold to Appellant [R.
95-98].

Richard Lambert, who represented Respondents in the

formation of the Agreement, testified that he had never indicated
to Appellant which lot Appellant was to receive

[R. 131].

The

Agreement did not specify how the balance of the purchase price
was to be paid.

It stated only "terms to be arranged."

Appellant

testified at trial that "terms to be arranged" indicated that the
terms of financing had not yet been negotiated at the time of the
signing of the Agreement [R. 70] .

He testified further that

there had been no specific discussion whether the balance of the
purchase price would be paid in lump sum, by installment payments,
or some other way [R. 57].

Lambert's testimony was supportive of

Appellant's on this point.

He stated at trial that there had

been no discussion with Appellant regarding how the purchase
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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would be financed

[R. 131].

After the signing of the Agreement, Appellant made application for a loan from Zions First National Bank, Salt Lake City,
Utah (hereinafter "Zions Bank") in an amount of eighty percent
(80%) of the purchase price of the property [R. 73].

He never

received any written commitment that he would receive such a
loan, nor had he ever received any proceeds as a result of his
application [R. 58, 74].

Appellant applied to one or more other

lending institutions in an attempt to raise the balance of the
purchase price, but never received any proceeds therefrom [R. 7475].

There was no evidence presented at trial that Respondents

had received a construction loan from Zions Bank based on a
financing commitment received from Zions Bank by Appellant.

The

testimony of the Bank's loan officer, Douglas Giver, to whom
Appellant had applied, was that he could not remember whether
Appellant had been qualified [R. 103-04].

Appellant never has

been in possession of the balance of the purchase price [R. 67,
81], nor has he ever made any tender or offer of such to Respondents

[R. 75].

He testified that he has never had the means to

pay that amount without liquidating other assets [R. 76].
On March 23, 1977 Appellant received a letter from Respondents asking that Appellant deposit approximately $13,000 in an
escrow account in Zions Bank [Exhibit 4; R. 59-60].

Appellant

deposited a check for $13,500 in the Bank on April 8, 1977
[Exhibit 5; R. 61], although he did not feel that he was required
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to do so under the terms of the Agreement [R. 60-61].

Six weeks

later on May 20, 1977 Appellant withdrew the full amount in the
escrow account of $13,500.

He did so because, as he stated at

trial, the fourplex units had not yet been completed and because
the escrow account was non-interest bearing [R. 62].
ARGUMENT
I.
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE FINDINGS
OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT.
SUCH
FINDINGS SHOULD BE EXAMINED, ON APPEAL,
IN A LIGHT FAVORABLE TO RESPONDENTS.
The trial court's Findings of Fact were as follows:
1. On or about April 23, 1976 the plaintiff
and defendants entered into an Earnest Money
Receipt and Offer to Purchase entered into as
evidence as plaintiff's Exhibit l herein.
2. At the time of execution of said agreement
no specific fourplex, of which there were three
offered for sale by defendants, was agreed upon.
None of the fourplexes being offered for sale by
defendants are located at the "corner of Hillview
and Ninth East" as provided in Exhibit l, Line 5.
3. At the time of execution of Exhibit l, the
plaintiff intended to consummate the purchase by
obtaining financing of a substantial portion of
the purchase price and, therefore, the terms
regarding financing, to wit "terms to be arranged,"
were not discussed, negotiated or agreed to, but
were left to future agreement.
It was discussed
and agreed, however, that the agreement was contingent upon plaintiff obtaining the necessary
financing.
4. At no time has plaintiff ever actually obtained
the financing necessary to consummate the purchase
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of the property, nor has he made any offer or tender
of the purchase price nor demonstrated his ability
to consummate purchase.
[R. 41-42]
The Supreme Court is empowered by the Utah Constitution,
Art. VIII, Sec. 9, to review questions of fact on appeal in
equity cases.

Such power notwithstanding, it has been the prac-

tice of this court not to disturb the findings of fact of the
trial court unless such findings appear to be "clearly erroneous
and against the weight of the evidence."
581 P.2d 996, 997

(Ut. 1978).

McBride v. McBride,

This rule is supported by Del

Porto v. Nicolo, 27 Ut.2d 286, 495 P.2d 811, 812 (1972);
Nokes v. Continental Min. & Mill. Co., 6 Ut.2d 177, 308 P.2d 954,
954-55 (1957); and Crocket v. Nish, 106 Ut. 241, 147 P.2d 852,
854 (1944), all of which were cited by Appellant in his brief.
InKier v. Condrack, 25 Ut.2d 139, 478 P.2d 327, 329 (1970) the
court stated that in reviewing the facts of a case in equity the
court should do so in the light of the evidence as believed by
the trial court, and not necessarily as urged from the point of
view of the Appellant.

See also Coombs v. Ouzounian, 24 Ut.2d

39, 465 P.2d 356, 357 (1970).

It has been further held that in

equity cases considerable difference will be allowed for the
advantageous position of the trial court, which provides a better
basis for insight into the truthfulness of the testimony, Nokes,
supra.

The findings and judgment of the trial court will thus be

left undisturbed unless "the evidence clearly preponderates
against them, or the court has mistaken or misapplied the law
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applicable thereto."
1975).

Pagano v. Walker, 539 P.2d 452, 454

(Ut.

This rule is equally applicable in cases where the relief

sought is specific performance.

Cook v. Gardner, 14 Ut.2d 193,

381 P. 2d 78 (1963).
Respondents maintain that there was ample evidence presented
at trial to support the Findings of Fact of the trial court.

The

Findings are not "clearly erroneous" nor do they "preponderate
against the evidence," as must be shown before such findings may
be upset on appeal.

Respondents urge that as this court examines

the evidence it do so in a light favorable to the Findings of the
trial court.
A.

Location of the Fourplex.

There was sufficient evidence

to support the trial court's Finding of Fact that no specific
fourplex was agreed upon, and that none of the fourplexes being
offered for sale by Respondents was located at the place designated in the Agreement [R. 41].
The Agreement specifies that the Earnest Money given by
Appellant was to secure the purchase of property situated at
"corner of Hillview and Ninth East."

Respondents never at any

time owned a lot on any corner of those two intersecting streets
(R. 93, 113-14].

The instant action was instituted by Appellant

to cause Respondents to sell him another lot owned by Respondents,
which in no way can be construed as being located at the "corner
of Hillview and Ninth East."

Appellant testified at trial that

the fourplex for which he had entered into the Agreement was not
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located at that corner [R. 64-66].

At the time of the signing of

the contract Respondents did not own any lot on Hillview Drive,
but were in the process of negotiating for the purchase of four
lots, including the corner lot.

Respondents were subsequently

able to purchase three of the lots, but the owner of the corner
lot decided not to sell [R. 92-93, 113-14].

Appellant further

stated that at the signing of the Agreement he did not have any
document which gave a better description of the location of the
fourplex he was to buy than the statement in the Agreement that
it was on the corner of Hillview and Ninth East [R. 66].
Appellant cites Kier, supra, and Continental Bank &
Trust co. v. Stewart, 4 Ut.2d 228, 291 P.2d 890, 891-92

(1957)

for the proposition that surrounding circumstances can be examined and parol evidence admitted to aid in the determination of
the intent of the parties at the time of the signing of a contract.
However, these cases plainly state that the contract should first
be examined on its face, and that extrinsic evidence will only be
admitted to determine the intent of the parties if the written
contract is vague and uncertain on a particular point.

Continental

Bank & Trust Co. v. Bybee, 6 Ut.2d 98, 306 P.2d 773, 775 (1957)
states that the intent of the parties should first be ascertained
from "the four corners of the instrument itself" before extrinsic
evidence will be allowed, and that if the ambiguity can be reconciled from a reasonable interpretation of the instrument,
extrinsic evidence should not be allowed.

In the instant case
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there is no need to venture beyond the four corners of the Agreement, which specifies that the lot to be sold was on the corner
of Hillview and Ninth East.

Respondents had been unable to
Thus, since the

negotiate the purchase of the corner lot.

Respondents never did own the corner lot, the contract for its
sale is plainly unenforceable.
Appellant asserts that it was the intent of Respondents
to sell him one of the three lots which Respondents were able to
purchase.

Assuming, arguendo, that this was true, there is no

evidence regarding which of the three lots, none of which was
located on the corner, was to go to Appellant.

At the time of

the execution of the Agreement, Respondents had negotiated to
sell only one of the three lots [R. 95].

It was yet to be nego-

tiated which of the two remaining lots would be sold to Appellant
[R. 95-98].

Richard Lambert, who represented Respondents in the

formation of the Agreement, testified that he had never indicated
to Appellant, either before or at the time of the signing of the
Agreement, which lot Appellant was to receive [R. 131].
The fact that two of the three lots were eventually
sold, leaving one remaining, is irrelevant.

At the time of the

signing of the Agreement it was uncertain which of the lots
Appellant was to receive.

In both Kier, supra, and Continental

Bank & Trust v. Stewart, supra, this court held that the purpose
of an examination of extrinsic evidence is to ascertain the
intent of the parties at the time of the signing of the contract.
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In the instant case the testimony demonstrates unequivocally that
at the time of the signing of the Agreement it was not certain
which of the three lots Appellant was to receive [R. 95-98, 131].
Appellant argued that parol evidence admitted at trial establishes
the identity of the fourplex for which he is suing.

This court

has held, regarding the use of parol evidence in identifying
property, in Davison v. Robbins, 30 Ut.2d 338, 517 P.2d 1026
( 197 3) :
Parol evidence is admissible to apply, not
to supply, a description of lands in a contract.
Parol evidence will not be admitted to complete
a defective description or to show the intention
with which it was made.
Parol evidence may be
used for the purpose of identifying the description contained in the writing with its location
upon the ground, but not for the purpose of ascertaining and locating the land about which the
parties negotiated, and supplying a description
thereof which they have omitted from the writing.
Id. at 1029.
B.

Terms to be Arranged.

There was sufficient evidence

presented at trial to support the trial court's Finding of Fact
that Appellant intended to obtain financing of a substantial
portion of the purchase price, and that terms regarding financing,
"terms to be arranged," were not discussed, negotiated or agreed
to, but were left to future agreement [R. 42].
Appellant testified as follows:
Q.

And why don't you tell me what was said
relative to that term on Line 21, Terms
to be Arranged; what you said and what
he said?

A.

I believe as he was reviewing the Agreement
with me, he simply indicated that it would
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be filled out that way since we did not know
yet what closing date would be or the final
details of the financing.

Q.

And did you have any further discussions
than that?

A.

No.

Q.

Just that it would be left that way since
you didn't know the closing date or how
did you say it, final details of the financing?

A.

The details of the financing,
I needed to borrow.

[R.

70]

the portion that

Appellant also testified that he had no discussions with Respondents concerning the payment of the balance of the purchase price
[R. 57].

He stated that he did discuss with Richard Lambert

"generally what he [Lambert]

thought financing terms would be at

Zions [Bank] if he applied with his balance sheet," but that
there was "no specific discussion" whether the amount would be
paid in lump sum, or by installment payments, or by any other
manner

[R. 57].
Richard Lambert testified that the phrase "terms to be

arranged" referred to the fact that Appellant was to arrange for
future financing of the balance of the purchase price of the
fourplex

[R. 121-22].

He further testified that it was not

specifically discussed whether Appellant would pay the balance by
cash or if he would finance it, but that he assumed it would be
financed

[R. 131].

Appellant asserts that Lambert told Responder.!

that Appellant was going to arrange financing with Zions Bank and
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pay Respondents the full balance of the purchase price at the
closing of title to the fourplex [Brief of Appellant, p. 10].
The evidence does not support this assertion.
was not that definite.

The arrangement

Appellant himself testified that there

was no specific discussion "as to whether the amount would be
paid in lump sum, or by installment payments, or any other means"
[R. 57].

Lambert merely testified that the Agreement "was a very

loose arrangement" and that he had told Respondents that "what
Alan [Appellant] will do is get his financing and probably cash
you out at the time of the completion"

[R. 123]

(emphasis added).

The evidence presented at trial lends ample support to the finding
of the trial court that the terms of financing were yet to be
negotiated at a future point, after the Agreement had been entered
into.
It was further discussed and agreed that the Agreement
was contingent upon Appellant obtaining the necessary financing
[R. 126].

c.

Appellant's Financing of the Purchase.

There was also

sufficient evidence presented at the trial to support the Finding
of Fact of the trial court that Appellant had never at any time
obtained the financing necessary to consummate the purchase of
the property, and that he had not made any offer or tender of the
purchase price nor demonstrated his ability to consummate the
purchase [R. 42].
Appellant testified at trial that at the time of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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signing of the Agreement (April 23, 1976) he did not have $70,000
in cash, but that he would have to have it financed

[R. 67).

He

stated that although he did thereafter seek financing at Zions
Bank, he never received any written commitment that he would be
given the loan [R. 58).

He further testified that he had never

received any proceeds from Zions Bank from his application for
the loan [R. 74).
Appellant had applied to one or more lending institutions,
besides Zions Bank, according to his testimony, but had never
received any proceeds from any such institutions

[R. 75).

Accord-

ing to his own testimony, Appellant never at any time had the
means, without borrowing or liquidating some of his other assets,
to pay the balance of the purchase price

($69,500)

[R. 76, 81).

Appellant testified that he had never made any tender or
offer of the balance of the purchase price to Respondents

[R. 75].

Contrary to Appellant's assertions in his brief that
Appellant's loan would have been closed at the same time the
construction of the fourplex was projected to be completed [Brief
of Appellant, pp. 10-11, 14), there is no evidence that Appellant
had any promise from any Bank that the necessary funds would be
lent to him.

The portions of the record cited by Appellant do

not support his conclusions.
Appellant further claims in his Brief that Appellant's
loan application had to be approved by Zions Bank as a condition
precedent to Zions Bank granting a construction to Respondents
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[Brief of Appellant, pp. 3, 11].

He cites to the testimony of

Douglas Giver, the loan officer at Zions Bank to whom Appellant
had made application.

However, Giver's testimony at the trial

was that he could not remember whether Appellant had been qualified for the loan or not.

He does not state anywhere that the

granting of Appellant's loan was a condition precedent to the
granting of Respondents' construction loan [R. 103-10].

If such

was the case, why did Appellant apply for a loan at one or more
lending institutions besides Zions Bank, as he testified he did?
[R.

75]

Respondents maintain that the evidence presented at
trial is supportive of the trial court's Findings of Fact and
urge this court to consider such evidence in a light favorable to
the findings.

The Findings of Fact are solidly based on the

evidence.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN
CONCLUDING, AS A MATTER OF LAW, THAT
THE AGREEMENT WAS VAGUE, AMBIGUOUS,
UNCERTAIN, CONTINGENT AND INCOMPLETE
ON ITS FACE AND THAT IT IS NOT CAPABLE
OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
The trial court's Conclusions of Law are as follows:
1.
The Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to
Purchase, plaintiff's Exhibit 1, is vague,
ambiguous, uncertain, contingent and incomplete
on its face and is not capable of specific performance.
2.
The plaintiff has failed to establish a
valid, legally enforceable contract or that he
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has complied with its terms by performing or
offering to perform his portion of the Agreement
by obtaining the necessary financing or tendering
the purchase price, and, therefore, cannot maintain an action for specific performance.
3. The plaintiff is entitled to refund of the
Earnest Money deposit of $500.00.
[R. 41-42]
This court, in Pagano, supra, stated that considerable
indulgence would be given to the findings and judgment of the
trial court in an equity case, and that a judgment would not be
overruled unless the trial court had mistaken or misapplied the
law applicable to the facts.

Id. at 454.

The trial court in the

present case has properly applied the law to the facts of this
case.

The judgment of the trial court should not be overruled.
The general rule regarding specific performance was stated

by this court in Pitcher v. Lauritzen, 18 Ut.2d 368, 423 P.2d 491
(1967).

There the plaintiff and defendant had signed an Earnest

Money Agreement for the sale of property.

The defendant had

agreed to sell 30 acres of the 189 acres which he owned, but the
Earnest Money Agreement did not specify which 30 acres of the 189
acres were to be conveyed to the plaintiff.

The contract was

additionally unclear regarding how the sale was to be financed.
The court held the Agreement unenforceable:
Specific performance cannot be required unless all
terms of the agreement are clear.
The court cannot compel the performance of a contract which the
parties did not mutually agree upon.
Id. at 493.
Quoting from 49 Am. Jur., Specific Performance, Sec.

22 at 35, the

court held further:
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J

The contract must be free from doubt, vagueness
and ambiguity, so as to leave nothing to conjecture
or to be supplied by the court.
It must be sufficiently certain and definite in its terms to leave
no reasonable doubt as to what the parties intended,
and no reasonable doubt of the specific thing equity
is called upon to have performed, and it must be
sufficiently certain as to its terms so that the
court may enforce it as actually made by the parties.
A greater degree of certainty is required for
specific performance in equity than is necessary
to establish a contract as the basis of an action
at law for damages.
Id. at 493.
The instant case is identical to the Pitcher case.

l'lhich

lot, of the three owned by Respondents, was to be conveyed to
Appellant was not determined at the time of the signing of the
Agreement.

The terms of financing were equally unclear.

Appellant cites in Kier, supra, in support of his argument
that the judgment of the trial court was erroneous.
in Kier was subscribed to by only one other Justice.

The opinion
One Justice

concurred only in the result and two other members of the court
dissented.

All three cited Pitcher as correctly stating the law

regarding specific performance.
The Kier case can be easily distinguished from the case at
hand.

Most importantly, the lower court in the Kier case had

ruled in favor of the plaintiff and had upheld the validity of
the Earnest Money Agreement.

Thus the issue on appeal was whether

there was sufficient evidence to support such a judgment.

This

court accordingly examined the evidence in a light favorable to
the lower court's findings and held that the evidence was sufficient.

In Kier the property in controversy was well-defined in
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the agreement.

In the instant case it is not.

In Kier the

plaintiff had made a tender of the entire purchase price to the
defendant.

478 P.2d at 329.

In the instant case no tender was

ever made.

The only similarity between Kier and the case at bar

lies in the fact that in both cases the terms for financing were
to be arranged in the future.

The Kier court stated:

Under the evidence and the particular facts of
this case, we are not convinced that we should
disagree with the view of this matter which it
is apparent was taken by the trial court.
Id. at 330 (emphasis added)
It was further noted that:
The reference to terms of payment could well be
regarded in this particular situation as incidental details. But neither party should be
permitted to use the reservation of 'terms' to
get more than they had promised, nor either to
renege on the bargain, as it appears that the
trial court believes was done here.
Id. at 330 (emphasis added)
Thus the court, in examining the evidence in a light favorable to
the findings of the trial court, intended to limit Kier to its
facts.
In the instant case the conclusion of the trial court, that
the Agreement is unenforceable, is valid because the location of
the particular fourplex is uncertain on the face of the Agreement,
and because the terms of financing were to be arranged.
In Eckard v. Smith, 527 P.2d 660 (1979)

this court held that

"specific performance cannot be granted unless the terms are
clear, and that clarity must be found from the language used in
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the document."

Id. at 662.

Since the terms of the Agreement in

the present case are not clear from the language in the document,
specific performance cannot be granted.
68 A.L.R.2d 1221, 1222 states:
The terms governing the manner and time of
payment of the price agreed upon have ordinarily
been regarded as such an important part of the
agreement that where the alleged contract expressly
left these terms open for future negotiation, the
courts have usually held that the minds of the
parties have never in fact met upon the essentials
and a conveyance of the property would not be
specifically enforced.
See Id. at 1222-28.

71 Am. Jur.

2d, Specific Performance, Sec. 41

at 63, is in accord.
Respondents contend that the trial court has not mistaken or
misapplied the law applicable to the Findings of Fact.

The

conclusion that the Agreement was vague, ambiguous, uncertain,
contingent and incomplete on its face, and that it was not capable
of specific performance should be upheld.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONCLUDING,
AS A MATTER OF LAW, THAT APPELLANT HAD FAILED
TO ESTABLISH A VALID, LEGALLY ENFORCEABLE
CONTRACT OR THAT HE HAD COMPLIED WITH ITS
TERMS BY PERFORMING OR OFFERING TO PERFOID1
HIS PORTION OF THE AGREEMENT BY OBTAINING THE
NECESSARY FINANCING OR TENDERING THE PURCHASE
PRICE, AND THAT HE THEREFORE CANNOT MAINTAIN
AN ACTION FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
The general rule in equity regarding the tender of performance
is that a party seeking specific performance of a contract must
show that he has made an appropriate effort to perform his obliSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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gations under the contract.

Equitable principles require that

Appellant must of necessity have made a tender of performance
before suing for specific performance.

This court so held in

Fischer v. Johnson, 525 P.2d 45 (Ut. 1974) in which the plaintiffs
sued for specific performance by the defendants of an Earnest
Money Agreement for property owned by the defendants.

The plain-

tiffs contended that they had sufficiently tendered performance
by giving notice to the defendants that they were ready and
willing to enter into and perform the purchase contract as
planned.

The court held that this tender of performance was not

sufficient because plaintiffs had not tendered any amount of the
purchase price, and that they had not indicated whether they had
available the $75,000 which was to be paid upon the execution of
the contract.

The court stated:

But it is also true that specific performance is
a remedy of equity; and one who invokes it must
have clean hands in having done equity himself.
That is, he must take care to discharge his own
duties under the contract;
He must make an
effort to perform or to tender performance, which
manifests reasonable diligence and a bona fide
desire to keep his own promises.
Id. at 46-47.
This court also held similarly in Lincoln Land & Development Co.
v. Thompson, 26 Ut.2d 324, 489 P.2d 426

(1971); Nance v. Schoonover

521 P.2d 896 (1974), both of which dealt with tender of performance
under an option contract.

See also 71 Am. Jur. 2d, Specific

Performance, Sec. 60 at 87-88.
The only attempt which Appellant made toward the tendering
of performance was in depositing $13,500 in an escrow account in
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Zions Bank, in accordance with a request made to Appellant by
Respondents in a letter dated March 23, 1977 [Exhibit 4; R. 59-61].
Appellant deposited the check on April 8, 1977

[Exhibit 5; R. 61].

However, on Hay 20, 1977 Appellant withdrew the $13,500 from
Zions Bank.

He stated that he withdrew the money because the

fourplex was still not completed and because the account was noninterest bearing [R. 62].

Respondents contend that the actions

of Appellant in depositing $13,500 in an escrow account for six
weeks and then withdrawing it do not satisfy the legal requirement
that he tender performance.
The trial court has not mistaken or misapplied the law
applicable to the Findings of Fact.

The conclusion of law that

Appellant cannot maintain an action for specific performance,
since he failed to obtain the necessary financing or to tender
the purchase price of the fourplex, should be affirmed by this
court.
CONCLUSION
The evidence presented at trial strongly supports the conclusions of the trial court that the Earnest !'Ioney Agreement
entered into by Appellant and Respondents is incapable of specific
performance.

There is ample evidence upon which the trial court

could have concluded that the Agreement was vague and uncertain.
It was never determined, at the time of the signing of the document, which of the three lots owned by Respondents was to be sold
to Appellant.

The Agreement itself specified only that the lot

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

was located at the "coiner of Hillview and Ninth East."

The

evidence conclusively demonstrated that Respondents never did, at
any time, own a lot so situated.

The conclusion that the contract

was too indefinite to be capable of specific performance was
further supported by the fact that the terms of financing were
"to be arranged," indicating that negotiations had not taken
place but were yet future.

Appellant's own testimony indicates

that it had not been decided, at the signing of the Agreement,
whether payment would be in a lump sum, or by installment payments [R. 57].

There was no definite understanding that the

balance of the purchase price would be paid at the closing of the
title to the property.
Appellant is not in a position to pray for specific performance.

He has not done equity himself by tendering the purchase

price to Respondents.

Nor has he demonstrated that at any time

he had obtained financing necessary to consummate the purchase of
the property.
Respondents respectfully assert that the judgment of the
lower court was proper and pray that it be affirmed.
Dated this 25th day of June, 1979.
Respectfully submitted,
FOX, EDWARDS
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